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CAN PUNITIVE DAMAGES WITHSTAND A DUE
PROCESS CHALLENGE AFrER BANKERS LIFE
& CASUALTY CO. V. CRENSHAW AND
BROWNING-FERRIS INDUSTRIES OF
VERMONT V. KELCO DISPOSAL?
I. Introduction
Punitive or exemplary damages are damages, other than compensa-
tory or nominal damages, awarded against a person in a civil action to
punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him, and others
like him, from similar conduct in the future.' Long an integral part of
tort law, punitive damages were first awarded in the United States in
1791.2 By 1851, the Supreme Court declared that the doctrine of pu-
nitive damages was so well established that it would not "admit of
argument."3 In 1967, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution
presents no general bar to the assessment of punitive damages in a
civil case.4
In recent years, however, the Justices have indicated a willingness
to review the constitutionality of this formidable weapon of the plain-
tiff's bar.5 Last year, in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont v.
Kelco Disposal,6 the Court held that the eighth amendment's Exces-
sive Fines Clause did not apply to awards of punitive damages in ac-
tions between private parties.7 But Browning-Ferris was only a partial
victory for plaintiffs. Citing Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
2. Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 90 (1791).
3. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 362, 371 (1851) (stating that "if repeated
judicial decisions for more than a century are to be received as the best exposition of what
the law is, the question [of punitive damages] will not admit of argument").
4. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 159 (1967) (citing Day v. Wood-
worth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 362, 370-71 (1851)).
5. In 1985, the Supreme Court heard Aetna Life Insurance Company's appeal of a
$3.5 million punitive damage award in a case where the actual damages assessed were
$1,650.22. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986). Although the Court did
not address the appellant's contention that the punitive damage award violated the four-
teenth amendment's Due Process Clause, it recognized the importance of the issue,
"which, in an appropriate setting, must be resolved . Id. at 828-29. The Court
vacated the award on other grounds. Id. at 827-28.
In Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988), the Supreme Court
considered, but did not decide, the appellant's claim that the $1.6 million exemplary
damage award assessed against it violated the eighth amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause and the Due Process Clause. Id. at 77-78.
6. 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989).
7. Id. at 2912.
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Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,8 the Browning-Ferris major-
ity acknowledged that the Court had never addressed the question of
whether due process requires a check on undue jury discretion to
award punitive damages in the absence of any express statutory limit.9
This was a question to be left for another day.'0
In Crenshaw and Browning-Ferris, Justice O'Connor voiced her
opinion that the standardless discretion given to juries to assess puni-
tive damage awards presents vagueness and procedural due process
problems.'I In Browning-Ferris, Justice Brennan expressed his belief
that the minimum guidance received by juries in determining the size
of a punitive damage award may run afoul of procedural due pro-
cess. 12 While Justices O'Connor and Brennan addressed the proce-
dural due process and vagueness issues raised by punitive damages,
the Browning-Ferris majority framed the question in somewhat
broader terms. The Court recognized that the defendant sought due
process protections beyond fundamental fairness,'3 addressed directly
to the size of the award.' 4 Acknowledging some support for the argu-
ment that a civil damage award may be unconstitutionally excessive,
the Court seemed to suggest that there might be substantive as well as
procedural due process problems with punitive damages.' 5
8. 486 U.S. 71, 86 (1988).
9. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2921.
10. Id. This question may be resolved in the near future. On April 2, 1990, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to a due process challenge to punitive damages. Pacific
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 110 S. Ct. 1780 (1990).
11. "I adhere to my comments in Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, regard-
ing the vagueness and procedural due process problems presented by juries given unbri-
dled discretion to impose punitive damages." Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2924 (citation
omitted) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
This grant of wholly standardless discretion to determine the severity of punish-
ment appears inconsistent with due process. The Court has recognized that
"vague sentencing provisions may pose constitutional questions if they do not
state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given criminal stat-
ute." Nothing in Mississippi law warned appellant that by committing a tort
that caused $20,000 of actual damages, it could expect to incur a $1.6 million
punitive damages award.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 88 (1988) (citation omitted)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123
(1979)).
12. See Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2923 (Brennan, J., concurring).
13. Fundamental fairness is defined as due process of law applied to judicial proce-
dure. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 607 (5th ed. 1979). However, defendants in mass tort
litigations often argue that fundamental fairness prevents more than one plaintiff from
recovering punitive damages against a single tortfeasor. See, e.g., Leonen v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272, 283 (D.N.J. 1989).
14. See Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2921.
15. See id.
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This Note will consider whether punitive damages can withstand a
constitutional challenge brought under the Due Process Clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Part II of the Note examines how courts
have resolved procedural due process and traditional vagueness chal-
lenges to exemplary damage awards. This section also discusses Jus-
tice O'Connor's approach to the vagueness doctrine,1 6 and the
possibility that substantive due process may affect jury discretion to
award punitive damages. Part III discusses why punitive damages do
not violate the Due Process Clause. This Note concludes that puni-
tive damages are not unconstitutional on procedural due process, 7
fundamental fairness" or traditional vagueness grounds.1 9 While
stronger constitutional arguments against punitive damages lie in Jus-
tice O'Connor's vagueness approach 2° and the substantive due process
doctrine,21 this Note maintains that punitive damages meet both these
challenges.22
II. Due Process Challenges to Punitive Damages
Since the 1960s, defendants have asserted that exemplary damages
offend the fourteenth amendment's Due Process Clause.23 Typically,
their attacks focus on one or both of two theories. The first is that
juries have unbridled discretion to determine the size of a punitive
damage award, thus depriving a defendant of his procedural due pro-
cess right against arbitrary government action.24 The second theory is
that state standards for determining punitive liability are unconstitu-
tionally vague. 25 Defendants argue that because of such vagueness,
16. Justice O'Connor suggested that the Due Process Clause requires defendants to be
on notice of the potential size of punitive damage awards. See Crenshaw, 486 U.S. at 88
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
17. See infra notes 106-44 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 145-58 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 159-85 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 186-221 and accompanying text.
23. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 835 (2d Cir. 1967);
Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 404, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 96
(1970); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 719, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398,
419 (1967).
24. See Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 906 F.2d 1206, 1226
(8th Cir. 1990); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517, 1535-36 (D. Minn.
1989); FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 691 F. Supp. 87, 99 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 877 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1524 (1990); Toole, 251
Cal. App. 2d at 719, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
25. See Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 1355, 1365 (5th Cir. 1989), reh'g
denied, 894 F.2d 1414 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3546
(U.S. Feb. 13, 1990) (No. 89-1303), mandate of the Fifth Circuit stayed pending final
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juries have no standards to guide them in deciding whether a defend-
ant will be subject to punitive liability,26 and defendants are not pro-
vided with fair notice of what conduct is prohibited.27
Where numerous plaintiffs seek punitive damages against a defend-
ant for a single wrong, the defendant may advance a third theory by
arguing that multiple punitive damage awards violate the fundamen-
tal fairness requirement embodied in the Due Process Clause.2 s This
theory is closely related to Judge Friendly's famous dicta in Roginsky
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 29 Although Judge Friendly stopped short
of stating that multiple exemplary awards worked a deprivation of
due process, he opined that such awards amounted to overkill and did
more harm than good.3° Carrying Roginsky one step further, some
courts have held that multiple punitive damage awards violate a de-
fendant's right to fundamental fairness.3' Other courts, however,
have flatly rejected this contention. 2
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Crenshaw has sparked comment on
whether the vagueness doctrine requires a defendant to be given no-
tice of the potential size of a punitive damage award.3 3 However, be-
disposition of the petition for cert., 110 S. Ct. 1468 (1990); Leonen v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272, 278-80 (D.N.J. 1989); Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, 548 F.
Supp. 357, 377 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines,
760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 46 (Alaska 1979),
remanded on rehearing, 615 P.2d 621 (1980), 627 P.2d 204, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894
(1981), overruled on other grounds, Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 405 n.5 (1985);
Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 404, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
26. See Leonen, 717 F. Supp. at 278-80; Neal, 548 F. Supp. at 377; Sturm, Ruger, 594
P.2d at 46; Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 404-05, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
27. See Neal, 548 F. Supp. at 377; Sturm, Ruger, 594 P.2d at 46; Fletcher, 10 Cal.
App. 3d at 404-05, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
28. See Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1571 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986); Leonen, 717 F. Supp. at 281; Juzwin v. Amtorg Trad-
ing Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1060-61, vacated, 718 F. Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989).
29. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
30. See infra note 59.
31. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1188 (8th Cir.) (Heaney, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); Juzwin, 705 F. Supp. at 1061; In re Northern
District of California "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability Litigation, 526 F. Supp.
887, 899 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
32. See Cathey, 776 F.2d at 1571; Leonen, 717 F. Supp. at 283-84 (stating that
"although ... fundamental fairness demands that some safeguards be present to protect
defendants in mass tort litigations . . . , the Juzwin decision cites no legal or equitable
basis for allowing the first plaintiff who brings a claim to obtain punitive damages, and
then, denying punitive damages... to all those who follow").
33. See Note, Bankers Life: Justice O'Connor's Solution To The Jury's Standardless
Discretion To Award Punitive Damages, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719 (1989); Note,
Can Punitive Damages Standards Be Void For Vagueness?, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 52
(1988).
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cause of its recent origin, courts have not yet had occasion to address
the issue. Another issue not yet addressed by the courts is whether
substantive due process limits jury discretion to award punitive dam-
ages. Since the Browning-Ferris decision, the idea that substantive
due process places an outer limit on the size of an exemplary award
has gained popularity with the defense bar. 4
A. Procedural Due Process
The fourteenth amendment prohibits states from denying individu-
als life, liberty, or property without due process of law." The doc-
trine of procedural due process requires that a government provide
certain procedural safeguards before acting against that individual.36
In the context of punitive damages, it has been asserted that a defend-
ant is deprived of these procedural safeguards because state laws give
juries "standardless discretion" to determine the amount of a puni-
tive award.37 This assertion has been uniformly rejected by both fed-
eral and state courts for over twenty years.38
Courts generally agree that whether punitive damages are provided
for by state common law or statute, juries are never given standardless
discretion to award punitive damages. 39 In Toole v. Richardson-Mer-
rell Inc. ,' the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the Cali-
fornia exemplary damage statute41 on the ground that it contained no
standard by which to measure the punishment, nor any limitation as
34. See Frey, Do Punitives Fit the Crime?, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 9, 1989, at 14, col. 2.
35. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law;.. ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
36. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 338 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). However,
the Supreme Court has also held that due process can be satisfied when a state provides
an individual with a postdeprivation tort remedy. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527
(1981).
37. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2923 (1989)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("[P]unitive damages are imposed by juries guided by little
more than an admonition to do what they think is best."); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v.
Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 88 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("This grant of wholly
standardless discretion to determine the severity of punishment appears inconsistent with
due process.").
38. See Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 906 F.2d 1206, 1227-28
(8th Cir. 1990); Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272, 280-81 (D.N.J. 1989);
Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517, 1535-36 (D. Minn. 1989); FDIC v.
W.R. Grace & Co., 691 F. Supp. 87, 99 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 877
F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1524 (1990); Toole v. Richardson-Mer-
rell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 719, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 419 (1967).
39. See Leonen, 717 F. Supp. at 280-81; Kociemba, 707 F. Supp. at 1536; Grace, 691
F. Supp. at 99; Toole, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 719, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
40. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
41. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West 1970).
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to the amount to be awarded.4 2 The California Court of Appeal re-
jected the challenge, holding that, although the amount to be awarded
lies within the sound discretion of the trier of fact, exemplary dam-
ages must bear a reasonable relationship to actual damages suffered.43
States which allow plaintiffs to recover exemplary damages typi-
cally require juries to take certain factors into account when deter-
mining the quantum of such an award." Courts hold that a
consideration of these factors limits jury discretion and prevents juries
from doing what they subjectively think is right.45 For example, in
FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co.,46 a federal district court in Illinois held
that Illinois juries did not have unbridled discretion to determine the
size of a punitive damage award because they are instructed to con-
sider the station, wealth, and activities of the defendant and of others
42. Toole, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 719, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
43. Id.
In those jurisdictions which adhere to the reasonable relationship rule, courts prohibit
juries from assessing punitive damages in sums which "more than reasonably exceed" the
compensatory damages awarded in a particular case. Under this standard, a punitive
damage award which is more than three or four times greater than actual damages is
considered to be unreasonably excessive. See infra notes 119-35, 142 and accompanying
text.
44. See infra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 906 F.2d 1206,
1227-28 (8th Cir. 1990); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517, 1535-36 (D.
Minn. 1989).
46. 691 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 877 F.2d 614 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1524 (1990). In Grace, defendant Grace secured a $75
million loan from the Continental Illinois Bank through fraudulent misrepresentations.
Continental assigned the loan to the FDIC, which in turn brought an action against
Grace. An Illinois jury awarded the FDIC $25 million in compensatory damages and
$75 million in punitive damages. The trial judge held that the punitive damage award
was excessive and remitted it to $25 million. Grace, 877 F.2d at 616-17.
On appeal, Grace argued that the $25 million punitive damage award was unconstitu-
tional. The Seventh Circuit rejected this contention, holding that "the [punitive damage]
award here was excessive neither by Illinois nor by federal constitutional standards." Id.
at 623. However, the court reversed the punitive and compensatory damage awards, but
only because the jury had not properly computed the amount of compensatory damages:
The problem is with the award of compensatory damages.... The jury was
allowed to pick a figure out of the air .... Grace is entitled to a new trial,
though one limited to damages. The amount of punitive damages, related as
they are to compensatory damages, will have to be redetermined as well in the
new trial that we are ordering. We could take the position that the first trial
fixed the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages as one to one, so that
whatever the next award of compensatory damages is it will just have to be
doubled to yield the final judgment (before interest). But proportionality to
actual damages is not the only consideration in determining how large the
award of punitive damages should be, so the ratio will have to be redetermined
in the new trial that we are ordering on damages.
Id. at 623-24 (emphasis in original).
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in a position to commit similar offenses.47 The court recognized that
these instructions enable jurors, whose deliberations are assisted by
the arguments of counsel,4" to assess the appropriate amount of dam-
ages to punish and deter.49 Thus, a jury would know that a larger
amount would be necessary to punish a multinational corporation
than "would be necessary to punish a blue collar worker."50
Similarly, in Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,"'
the Eighth Circuit held that South Dakota law mandated that the
following factors be considered in setting a punitive damage award:
the amount allowed in compensatory damages; the nature and enor-
mity of the wrong; the intent of the wrongdoer; the wrongdoer's fi-
nancial condition; and all of the circumstances attendant to the
wrongdoer's actions, including any mitigating circumstances which
may operate to reduce, but not defeat, the punitive damages award. 5'
In light of these factors, the court rejected a defendant's assertion that
South Dakota law violated due process by conferring standardless dis-
cretion upon juries.5"
In State ex rel. Young v. Crookham,54 the Supreme Court of Oregon
stated that a consideration of the factors similar to those enumerated
in Grace and Davis reduces the danger that a punitive award will
destroy a defendant even when that defendant faces multiple suits. 55
The court noted that because juries review the financial condition 56
and the prior and potential punitive liability of the wrongdoer57 along
with societal concern for the injured and the future protection of
society,58 the so-called "overkill" argument 59 is highly exagger-
47. Grace, 691 F. Supp. at 99.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 906 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1990).
52. Id. at 1227.
53. Id. at 1227-28.
54. 290 Or. 61, 618 P.2d 1268 (1980).
55. See id. at 66, 72, 618 P.2d at 1271, 1274.
56. See id. at 66, 618 P.2d at 1271.
57. See id. at 72, 618 P.2d at 1274.
58. See id. at 66, 618 P.2d at 1271.
59. The overkill argument was first propounded by Judge Friendly.
We have the gravest difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive damages in
such a multiplicity of actions throughout the nation can be so administered as
to avoid overkill.... Although multiple punitive awards running into the hun-
dreds may not add up to a denial of due process, nevertheless if we were sitting
as the highest court of New York we would wish to consider very seriously
whether awarding punitive damages ... would not do more harm than good.
Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839-40 (2d Cir. 1967).
A number of courts have since rejected this argument. See Cathey v. Johns-Manville
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ated. I However, in Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp. ,61 a federal judge
concluded that submitting evidence of prior exemplary damage
awards to juries unduly prejudices a defendant's case.62
Another reason courts have rejected the contention that juries have
standardless discretion is that each punitive damage award is subject
to trial and appellate review. 63 Although most courts hold that judi-
cial review sufficiently protects defendants from awards which reflect
jury passion or prejudice, 64 Juzwin is one notable exception.65 The
Juzwin court concluded that judicial review of punitive damage
awards is unsatisfactory because it is not based upon any recognized
or established standards and simply reflects the subjective feelings of
Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1570 (6th Cir. 1985) ("Accordingly, we ... reject the so-
called 'overkill doctrine' as a basis for denying an otherwise proper punitive damages
recovery."), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986); Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, 548 F.
Supp. 357, 376-77 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian
Mines, 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985); Crookham, 290 Or. at 66, 618 P.2d at 1271 ("Hind-
sight demonstrates that the apprehension of the Roginsky court was heavily exaggerated.
Of the 1,500 cases, in only 3 did juries award punitive damages. The vast majority of
cases were settled and the financial destruction feared by the Second Circuit did not come
to pass."); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 307, 294 N.W.2d 437, 461 (Wis.
1980) ("[W]e are confident that the fair administration of punitive damage awards in the
state courts of this country will prove Judge Friendly's fears unfounded.").
60. See Crookham, 290 Or. at 66, 618 P.2d at 1271.
61. 705 F. Supp. 1053, vacated, 718 F. Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989).
62. In Juzwin, Judge Sarokin stated:
It has been suggested that one of the means available to a defendant to combat
the cumulative effect of successive punitive damage awards against it is to offer
evidence as to the prior awards and ask the jury to offset their own verdict to
the extent of those earlier awards. This alternative, although valid in concept, is
unrealistic in practice. It requires a defendant to advise the jury that prior ju-
ries hearing the same evidence have already found that the defendant's conduct
was so egregious as to warrant punitive damage awards. To require a defendant
to present such prejudicial evidence to a jury as its only alternative is to place it
between Scylla and Charybdis.
Juzwin, 705 F. Supp. at 1056.
Expressing concern that the imposition of repeated penalties on the same defendant
could preclude recovery of compensatory damages by subsequent plaintiffs, 'and echoing
Judge Friendly's fears of corporate destruction, the Juzwin court held that multiple puni-
tive damage awards for a single wrong violate the fundamental fairness requirement of
the Due Process Clause. Id. at 1055, 1061.
63. See Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 906 F.2d 1206, 1227-28
(8th Cir. 1990); Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272, 281 (D.N.J. 1989);
Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517, 1536 (D. Minn. 1989); FDIC v.
W.R. Grace & Co., 691 F. Supp. 87, 99-100 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd in part rev'd in part,
877 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1524 (1990); Neal, 548 F. Supp. at
377.
64. See Davis, 906 F.2d at 1227-28; Brown v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 703 F.2d 1050,
1054 (8th Cir. 1983); Leonen, 717 F. Supp. at 281; Kociemba, 707 F. Supp. at 1536;
Grace, 691 F. Supp. at 99-100; Neal, 548 F. Supp. at 377.
65. See Juzwin, 705 F. Supp. at 1056-57.
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the court.66
B. Void for Vagueness Doctrine
The foundation of the void for vagueness doctrine lies in the Due
Process Clause.67 The Supreme Court has held that for a law to com-
port with due process, it must afford the public adequate notice of the
conduct it prohibits and must provide judges and jurors with suffi-
cient guidelines for its application. 68 A law which does not meet both
of these requirements is unconstitutionally vague. 9
Primarily intended to protect the public from ambiguously phrased
criminal statutes, 70 the Supreme Court has employed the void for
vagueness doctrine to assess the constitutionality of civil legislation as
well.71 In Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc. ,72 the Court indicated that criminal statutes require greater clar-
ity than civil statutes because the sanctions provided by the former
are qualitatively more stringent. 73 This suggests that there are situa-
tions where the quality of a penalty for violating a civil statute is so
severe that the statute warrants scrutiny under the stricter vagueness
test reserved for criminal laws.74
66. "[Tlhe right to review is no more satisfactory than the jury's initial determination,
because it is dependent upon the visceral reaction of the court rather than on any estab-
lished or recognized standards." Id.
67. See Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966).
68. Id. at 402-03.
69. Id.
70. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 230 (1951) ("The essential purpose of the
'void for vagueness' doctrine is to warn individuals of the criminal consequences of their
conduct.").
71. See Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966); Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S.
223 (1951).
72. 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
73. "The Court has also expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather
than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less se-
vere." Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498-99. See also Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 137 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515
(1948).
74. For example, if the penalty for violating a civil statute affects a defendant's per-
sonal liberty, the statute may be considered tantamount to a criminal sentencing provi-
sion and as such, subject to the stricter vagueness test. In Giaccio and DeGeorge, the
Supreme Court disregarded the distinction between criminal and civil laws in applying
the vagueness doctrine to the civil statutes at bar. See Giaccio, 382 U.S. at 402; DeGeorge,
341 U.S. at 231. In Giaccio, a Pennsylvania law allowed the state to imprison acquitted
defendants if they were assessed and failed to pay the court costs of criminal prosecu-
tions. Giaccio, 382 U.S. at 401. In DeGeorge, a civil statute provided for the deportation
of aliens. The Court recognized that " 'deportation is a drastic measure and at times the
equivalent of banishment or exile .... It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in
this country.' " DeGeorge, 341 U.S. at 231 (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6,
10 (1948)).
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There are two prongs to the argument that punitive damages are
unconstitutionally vague. The first is that the standards for determin-
ing punitive liability are so vague that juries have arbitrary power to
decide when to impose punitive damages, and defendants are not
given fair notice of what conduct is prohibited." The second is that
the defendant is not given sufficient notice of the potential size of a
punitive award.7 6
1. Vagueness of the Standards for Determining Punitive Liability
Typically, states allow juries to award punitive damages only upon
a showing that a defendant's conduct was wanton,7 7 willful, 78 mali-
cious 79 or outrageous.8" Defendants maintain that because of the
vagueness of these standards, juries are given the power to decide sub-
jectively what behavior is or is not prohibited in each case,"' and de-
fendants are not put on notice of what conduct will incur punitive
liability.82 The courts, however, have held that terms such as wanton,
willful, malicious, and outrageous are sufficiently clear to defeat these
vagueness challenges.8 3 Nonetheless, defendants continue to claim
that the standards which serve as a predicate for imposing punitive
75. See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
77. See FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 691 F. Supp. 87, 99 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 877 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1524 (1990).
78. Grace, 691 F. Supp. at 99.
79. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 404, 89 Cal. Rptr.
78, 96 (1970).
80. See Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 46 (Alaska 1979), remanded on
rehearing, 615 P.2d 621 (1980), 627 P.2d 204, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981), overruled
on other grounds, Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 405 n.5 (1985).
81. See Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, 548 F. Supp. 357, 377 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd
sub nom. Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985); Sturm,
Ruger, 594 P.2d at 46; Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 405, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 96. See also
Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272, 278-80 (D.N.J. 1989).
82. See Neal, 548 F. Supp. at 377 (action brought against asbestos suppliers and prod-
uct manufacturers for failure to warn of the dangers of asbestos); Sturm, Ruger, 594 P.2d
at 46 (products liability action against gun manufacturer); Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at
405, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 96 (action against insurance company for intentional infliction of
mental distress by threatening to withhold and actually withholding disability benefits).
See also Leitner, Punitive Damages: A Constitutional Assessment, 38 FED'N OF INS. &
CORP. COUNS. Q. 119, 126-32 (1988).
For example, if a defendant's act of firing a gun in the air results in injury to the
plaintiff, the defendant may reasonably expect to be held liable for compensatory dam-
ages. However, the defendant will argue that he could not anticipate punitive liability
because terms such as wanton and outrageous are so vague that he did not expect them to
apply to the act of firing a gun in a public space.
83. See Leonen, 717 F. Supp. at 278-80; Neal, 548 F. Supp. at 377; Sturm, Ruger, 594
P.2d at 46; Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 404-05, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
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liability are unconstitutionally vague.84
2 Insufficient Notice of the Potential Size of a Punitive Damage
Award
The second prong of the argument that punitive damages are un-
constitutionally vague embraces the idea that the Due Process Clause
requires defendants in civil actions to be given sufficient notice of the
potential size of a punitive award." This theory originated in Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v.
Crenshaw.86 In that case, Justice O'Connor implied that punitive
damage schemes are equivalent to criminal sentencing laws. 7 Be-
cause sentencing provisions may be unconstitutionally vague if they
do not clearly state the consequences of violating a given criminal
statute,88 Justice O'Connor reasoned that punitive damage schemes
may be unconstitutional for failing to warn defendants of the amount
of the penalty for wrongful behavior.8 9
Whether a defendant has a due process right to be aware of the
potential size of an exemplary damage award depends on the Supreme
Court's willingness to review the civil remedy of punitive damages
under the stricter vagueness standards9' reserved for criminal stat-
utes.9' Despite the penal nature of punitive damages, the Court is not
certain to do this. In Browning-Ferris, the Court recognized the dis-
84. See Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 1355, 1365 (5th Cir. 1989), reh'g
denied, 894 F.2d 1414 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3546
(U.S. Feb. 13, 1990) (No. 89-1303), mandate of the Fifth Circuit stayed pending final
disposition of the petition for cert., 110 S. Ct. 1468 (1990); Leonen, 717 F. Supp. at 278-80.
85. See Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 86-89 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
86. 486 U.S. 71, 86-89 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. Justice O'Connor stated:
The Court has recognized that "vague sentencing provisions may pose constitu-
tional questions if they do not state with sufficient clarity the consequences of
violating a given criminal statute." Nothing in Mississippi law warned appellant
that by committing a tort that caused $20,000 of actual damages, it could ex-
pect to incur a $1.6 million punitive damages award.
Id. at 88 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123
(1979)).
88. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979).
89. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. at 88.
90. In this context, the words "standard" and "test" merely refer to the general prin-
ciple that the vagueness doctrine requires criminal statutes to be clearer and more precise
than civil statutes. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982); Barenblatt v. United States, 360'U.S. 109, 137 (1959) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948).
91. See infra notes 186-203 and accompanying text.
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tinction between punitive damages and criminal penalties.92 Accord-
ingly, the Browning-Ferris Court held that a punitive damage
defendant in an action between private parties is not entitled to the
safeguard of the eighth amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.9 3
C. Substantive Due Process
The substantive component of the Due Process Clause prohibits a
state from taking certain actions regardless of the fairness of the pro-
cedures used to implement them. 94 The substantive due process im-
plications of punitive damages remain unclear because courts have
not yet addressed them.95 Relying on St. Louis, I M & S. Ry. v.
Williams,96 the Browning-Ferris Court seemed to suggest that substan-
tive due process may place an outer limit on the size of an exemplary
award that a jury can assess. 9 7
In Williams, the petitioner claimed that an Arkansas statute vio-
lated the Due Process Clause by allowing passengers to recover dam-
ages of "not less than fifty dollars, nor more than three hundred
dollars"98 in civil actions against railroads that overcharged fares. 99
The Williams Court recognized that substantive due process prohib-
ited states from prescribing severe and oppressive penalties that are
wholly disproportionate to the offense and obviously unreasonable. loO
However, the Court upheld the statute and concluded that a seventy-
five dollar damage judgment against the petitioner for a sixty-six cent
overcharge was neither severe nor oppressive when considered in light
of the public interests and the numberless opportunities for commit-
ting the offense. 0 1
Williams involved a civil damage award made pursuant to a statu-
tory scheme. Whether substantive due process similarly limits the
size of a punitive damage award assessed by juries acting without stat-
92. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2916, 2919
(1989).
93. See id. at 2912.
94. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 338 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
95. In In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986), the Third Circuit
stated that "the concerns [about punitive damages] recited by a number of courts and
commentators are centered on the substantive component of due process." Id. at 1004.
Unfortunately, the court failed to cite any of these sources and failed to specify what
substantive due process problems punitive damages may create. See id. at 1004.
96. 251 U.S. 63 (1919).
97. See Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2921.
98. Williams, 251 U.S. at 64.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 66-67.
101. Id.
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utory guidelines remains undecided.°10  A damage award "made with-
out the benefit of a legislature's deliberation and guidance" is perhaps
more likely to be disproportionate to the offense than an award con-
strained by statutory limits."°3 But Williams does show that a puni-
tive award does not violate substantive due process merely because
the amount of the penalty far exceeds the actual injury."°4 The Wil-
liams Court emphasized that the interests of the public and the need
for punishment and deterrence must be considered when determining
whether an award is constitutionally excessive.
10 5
III. Punitive Damages Do Not Violate Due Process
A. Legal Reasons
1. Juries Do Not Have Unfettered Discretion to Award Punitive
Damages
Punitive damages serve to punish a defendant and to deter him and
others like him from committing the same acts in the future.0 6
Therefore, the amount of an exemplary damage award is determined
from the perspective of the defendant rather than that of the plain-
tiff.'07 Since each case is different, 10 there can be no fixed formula for
102. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2921
(1989).
103. See id. at 2923 (Brennan, J., concurring).
104. See Williams, 251 U.S. at 66-67. The Williams Court did not let the judgment
stand merely because the absolute size of the award was relatively small. In Waters-
Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909), the State of Texas fined the defendant corpo-
ration $1.6 million for violating the state's antitrust laws. The defendant asserted that the
fine was so excessive that it amounted to a deprivation of due process. Noting that the
defendant had over $40 million worth of assets, the Supreme Court held that the award
did not offend the Due Process Clause. Id. at 111-12.
105. The Williams Court remarked:
When the penalty is contrasted with the overcharge possible in any instance it
of course seems large, but, as we have said, its validity is not to be tested in that
way. When it is considered with due regard for the interests of the public, the
numberless opportunities for committing the offense, and the need for securing
uniform adherence to established passenger rates, we think it properly cannot
be said to be so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the
offense or obviously unreasonable.
Williams, 251 U.S. at 67.
106. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
107. "[Punitive damages] are assessed for purposes of punishment and deterrence and,
thus, are determined 'from the perspective of the defendant rather than of the plaintiff.' "
Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272, 281 (D.N.J. 1989) (quoting Fischer v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 103 N.J. 643, 657, 512 A.2d 466, 473 (1986).
108. See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 362, 371 (1851) ("[T]he degree of
punishment.., must depend on the peculiar circumstances of each case."); Neal v. Carey
Canadian Mines, 548 F. Supp. 357, 377 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ("Each tort committed by the
defendant is individual and peculiar to that particular plaintiff who has brought suit."),
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assessing an appropriate penalty.'°9 Instead, a jury must award puni-
tive damages by reference to objective factors such as the wealth of
the defendant, 1 0 the nature of the wrong,"' and the importance of
the public interest violated. 12
Far from conferring unfettered discretion, this system prevents ju-
rors from dispensing justice based on their personal feelings of right
and wrong. 13 There is no standardless discretion because a jury must
look to the relevant factors as a guide in determining what amount
would be sufficient to achieve the goals of punishment and deter-
rence. I 4 Thus, based on the judge's instructions and the arguments
of counsel, a jury would know that a smaller award would be needed
to punish a reckless defendant than would be needed to punish an
intentional wrongdoer.I " Similarly, a larger award would be neces-
sary to deter a defendant who has committed the same tort in the past
than would be necessary to deter a first offender.'1 6 The requirement
that a tortfeasor's financial position be considered ensures that a jury
will not assess damages in an amount that would bankrupt a
defendant.",7
aff'd sub nonm Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985);
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 302-03, 294 N.W.2d 437, 459 (Wis. 1980)
("The circumstances of each case must be considered to determine whether the award
under the particular circumstances of that case serves the purposes of punitive
damages.").
109. See Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Soc'y, 320 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1943) (constru-
ing Alabama law).
110. See Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 906 F.2d 1206, 1227
(8th Cir. 1990); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517, 1536-37 (D. Minn.
1989); FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 691 F. Supp. 87, 99 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 877 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1524 (1990).
111. See Davis, 906 F.2d at 1227; Kociemba, 707 F. Supp. at 1537; Grace, 691 F. Supp.
at 99.
112. See Kociemba, 707 F. Supp. at 1537; State ex rel. Young v. Crookham, 290 Or.
61, 72, 618 P.2d 1268, 1274 (1980); Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 305, 294 N.W.2d at 460.
113. See Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272, 280-81 (D.N.J. 1989);
Grace, 691 F. Supp. at 99; Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 302-05, 294 N.W.2d at 458-60.
114. See Davis, 906 F.2d at 1227-28; Leonen, 717 F. Supp. at 280-81; Kociemba, 707 F.
Supp. at 1536; Grace, 691 F. Supp. at 99; Crookham, 290 Or. at 72, 618 P.2d at 1274;
Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 302-05, 294 N.W.2d at 458-60; supra notes 46-58 and accompany-
ing text.
115. See, e.g., Grace, 691 F. Supp. at 99.
116. See Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 1355, 1366 (5th Cir. 1989), reh'g
denied, 894 F.2d 1414 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3546
(U.S. Feb. 13, 1990) (No. 89-1303), mandate of the Fifth Circuit stayed pending final
disposition of the petition for cert., 110 S. Ct. 1468 (1990).
117. See Crookham, 290 Or. at 66, 618 P.2d at 1271 ("[F]inancial interests of the mali-
cious and wanton wrongdoer mustbe considered ... ."); Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 302-04,
294 N.W.2d at 458-60. The Wangen court observed:
Our cases have stated that the factors to be considered by the jury in determin-
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
By identifying the relevant factors that must be considered in as-
sessing exemplary damages, courts provide jurors with the means to
reach the ends of punishment and deterrence. Because both the
means and the ends must be considered, jurors have a clear roadmap
by which to reach an established destination. Thus, while juries have
some discretion to weigh the peculiar circumstances of each case,'" 8
that discretion cannot be called standardless.
In some states, a jury may not assess an exemplary damage award
which does not bear a reasonable relationship to actual injury. 1 9 In
these jurisdictions, punitive damage awards are seldom greater than
three or four times actual damages suffered. 20 Courts correctly hold
that the reasonable relationship rule limits jury discretion to award
punitive damages. 2' However, the reasonable relationship rule is un-
necessary because standardless discretion is avoided when jurors are
asked to consider the relevant factors1 22 to fix a sum sufficient to pun-
ish and deter. 23 Requiring a reasonable relationship between puni-
tive and compensatory damages as an additional check on jury
discretion may prevent the community from voicing its legitimate
ing the proper amount to be awarded as punitive damages include.., the de-
fendant's ability to pay .... The danger of excessive multiple punitive damage
awards can be avoided ... because the jury may consider the wealth of the
defendant which would include consideration of compensatory and punitive
damages and fines and forfeitures already imposed on the defendant or likely to
be imposed on the defendant.
Id.
118. See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 362, 371 (1851); Neal v. Carey Cana-
dian Mines, 548 F. Supp. 357, 377 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Van Buskirk v. Carey
Canadian Mines, 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985); Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 302-03, 294
N.W.2d at 459.
119. For example, in California, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, punitive damages must
bear a reasonable relationship to actual damages suffered. See Leonen v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272, 281 (D.N.J. 1989); Neal, 548 F. Supp. at 377; Toole v. Richard-
son-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 719, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 419 (1967).
120. See Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398
(punitive damage award was 1.4 times greater than compensatory damage award); Neal
v. Carey Canadian Mines, 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (punitive damage awards
were smaller than the compensatory damage awards), aff'd sub nom. Van Buskirk v.
Carey Canadian Mines, 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985). See also Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day,
615 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1980) (punitive damage award was 3.6 times greater than compen-
satory damage award when the Alaska Supreme Court applied the reasonable relation-
ship principle), remanded on rehearing, 627 P.2d 204, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981),
overruled on other grounds, Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 405 n.5 (1985).
121. See Leonen, 717 F. Supp. at 281; Neal, 548 F. Supp. at 377; Sturm, Ruger, 594
P.2d at 48.
122. These factors include the defendant's wealth, the nature of the wrong, and the
importance of the public interest violated. See supra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
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concerns for punishment and deterrence.' 24
For example, in Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 2 5 an Alaska jury
awarded $137,750 in compensatory damages'26 and $2,895,000 in pu-
nitive damages to a plaintiff for injuries sustained as a result of a de-
sign flaw in a gun manufactured by the defendant.' 27 The evidence at
trial showed that the defendant earned millions of dollars in profits
from the manufacture of more than 1,500,000 revolvers of the type
that caused the plaintiff's injuries.'28 To reach the exemplary damage
award of $2,895,000, the jury multiplied 1,500,000 by the increased
cost per revolver, $1.93, to cure the defect. 2 9 Although the verdict
clearly reflected dispassionate analysis of the case by the jury, the
Alaska Supreme Court followed the reasonable relationship princi-
ple 30 and reduced the award to $500,000.'13
St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Williams 132 indicates that the Constitu-
tion does not require a reasonable relationship between exemplary
and compensatory damages. 3 3 In that case, the Supreme Court held
that a punitive award which was one hundred fourteen times greater
than actual injury did not offend the Due Process Clause.' 34 Thus,
whether to afford punitive damage defendants the protection of the
124. If the plaintiff suffered $5,000 in compensatory damages, a jury in a jurisdiction
with a reasonable relationship rule would be able to award no more than $20,000 to
$25,000 in punitive damages even if it felt that more was needed to deter the defendant.
See Note, Punitive Damages and the Reasonable Relation Rule: A Study in Frustration of
Purpose, 9 PAC. L.J. 823, 824 (1978) ("By thus limiting the monetary amount that may be
awarded as punitive damages the reasonable relation rule limits the effectiveness of puni-
tive damages in' fulfilling the express functions of punishment and deterrence."); Note,
The Imposition Of Punishment By Civil Courts: A Reappraisal Of Punitive Damages, 41
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1158, 1170 (1966) ("This [reasonable relationship] requirement . . .
seems to ignore the important deterrent aspect of punitive damages .... ").
125. 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), remanded on rehearing, 615 P.2d 621 (1980), 627 P.2d
204, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Dura Corp. v. Harned,
703 P.2d 396, 405 n.5 (1985).
126. The compensatory damage award was reversed because the issue of comparative
fault was not submitted to the jury. See Sturm, Ruger, 594 P.2d at 42.
127. Sturm, Ruger, 594 P.2d at 41. The jury also found that the revolver had a manu-
facturing defect. Id.
128. Id. at 50 (Burke, J., dissenting).
129. Id.
130. However, the court stated that the reasonable relationship rule might be "totally
inapplicable" in some cases. Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 615 P.2d 621, 624 n.3 (Alaska
1980), remanded on rehearing, 627 P.2d 204, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981), overruled
on other grounds, Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 405 n.5 (1985).
131. Initially the Alaska Supreme Court held that the punitive damage award should
not exceed $250,000. On rehearing, the court held that a punitive damage judgment of
$500,000 could be entered on remand. See infra note 138.
132. 251 U.S. 63 (1919).
133. See supra notes 104, 105 and accompanying text.
134. Williams, 251 U.S. at 66-67.
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reasonable relationship rule is a decision which should be left to the
states. 135
Another reason the unfettered discretion argument must fail is that
defendants have the added procedural safeguards of trial and appel-
late review to ensure that a jury award does not lack the basic ele-
ments of fundamental fairness.136 While different jurisdictions have
different standards for determining whether or not to grant a new
trial, a judgment n. o. v., or a remittitur,137 judicial scrutiny of punitive
damage awards is intense and exacting. 138 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has held that punitive damages do not constitute a prior restraint in
135. The Browning-Ferris Court held:
[T]he propriety of an award of punitive damages for the conduct in question,
and the factors the jury may consider in determining their amount, are ques-
tions of state law.... Although petitioners and their amici would like us to
craft some common-law standard of excessiveness that relies on notions of pro-
portionality between punitive and compensatory damages, ... these are matters
of state, and not federal, common law.
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2922 (1989).
136. See Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 906 F.2d 1206, 1227-28
(8th Cir. 1990); Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1572 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp.
1517, 1536 (D. Minn. 1989); FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 691 F. Supp. 87, 100 (N.D. Ill.
1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 877 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1524 (1990).
137. For example, the Sixth Circuit has held that an appellate court should order a
new trial or a remittitur if a punitive damage award is "contrary to all reason." Cathey,
776 F.2d at 1572. In Illinois, an exemplary damage award will be reduced if it is "clearly
excessive." Grace, 691 F. Supp. at 100. In California, the test is whether the punitive
damage award was the result of "passion or prejudice." Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 408, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 98 (1970).
138. In Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), remanded on rehear-
ing, 615 P.2d 621 (1980), 627 P.2d 204, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981), overruled on
other grounds, Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 405 n.5 (1985), the Supreme Court
of Alaska held that the $2,895,000 punitive damage award was so out of proportion to
actual damages "as to suggest that the jury's award was the result of passion or preju-
dice" and that the trial judge abused his discretion by not reducing the punitive damage
award. Sturm, Ruger, 594 P.2d at 48. Remanding the case for a new trial as to compen-
satory and punitive damages, the court held that if punitive damages were awarded at the
second trial, they could not exceed $250,000. Id. at 48-49. On rehearing, the Alaska
Supreme Court held that the original punitive damage award was not the result of jury
passion or prejudice, but was simply an excessive verdict. Sturm, Ruger, 615 P.2d at 624.
The court further held that a "judgment for $500,000 in punitive damages may be entered
immediately upon remand." Id.
In a tortious breach of contract action against an insurance company, a California jury
awarded the plaintiff $123,600 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive dam-
ages. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal held that the exemplary award was so
grossly disproportionate as to clearly suggest passion or prejudice on the part of the jury.
Accordingly, the court reduced the punitive damage award to $2.5 mjllion. Egan v. Mu-
tual of Omaha Ins. Co., 63 Cal. App. 3d 659, 691-92, 133 Cal. Rptr. 899, 919-20 (1976).
The California Supreme Court vacated the punitive damage award holding that it "must
be deemed the result of passion and prejudice on the part of the jurors and excessive as a
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violation of the first amendment because freedom of speech and press
is adequately protected by judicial control over excessive verdicts.I39
The Juzwin court's criticism that judicial review of punitive dam-
ages is based upon the "gut feeling" of the trial or appellate court is
unfounded. 4° A court will review a case in its entirety and will set
aside or remit an exemplary award if it does not reasonably serve the
functions of punishment and deterrence or if it is the result of jury
bias or passion.14' Ina jurisdiction where there must be a reasonable
relationship between punitive and compensatory damages, judicial re-
view is an even greater check on jury discretion. Any award which is
greater than three or four times actual injury will be deemed excessive
and will not stand. 42
The case law makes it clear that judges are not loath to reduce
exemplary awards that are excessive or the result of passion or preju-
dice. 43 One commentator advocating the abolition of punitive dam-
ages concedes that punitive damages are frequently reduced by
remittitur in the trial court, or on subsequent appeal.144 In light of all
the protections a defendant receives during a jury trial and through
the appellate process, punitive damages cannot be said to deprive an
individual of procedural due process.
matter of law." Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 824, 620 P.2d 141,
149, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691, 699 (1979), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980).
139. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 159-60 (1967).
140. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. In Juzwin, Judge Sarokin stated that
"[d]efendants are entitled to know that there is a more substantial ground for appeal
other than that the verdict offends the 'gut feeling' of the trial or reviewing court."
Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1057, vacated, 718 F. Supp. 1233
(D.N.J. 1989).
141. See Grace, 691 F. Supp. at 100-02. The Grace court scrupulously and objectively
examined the facts in the trial record to reach its well reasoned determination that the
punitive damage award was excessive. See id. at 101.
142. See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger, 615 P.2d at 624 (punitive damage award 21 times greater
than compensatory damages reduced to a sum 3.6 times greater than compensatory dam-
ages); Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 824, 620 P.2d at 149, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 699 (punitive damage
award forty times greater than compensatory damages vacated).
143. Indeed, the General Accounting Office found that between 1983 and 1985, appel-
late courts in five states reversed or remanded for retrial all twelve punitive damage
awards on which they ruled. Study Says Punitive Awards Aren't Excessive, Nat'l L. J.,
Nov. 27, 1989, at 5, col. 1.
144. See Ingram, Punitive Damages Should Be Abolished, 17 CAP. U.L. REV. 205, 206
(1988).
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2. Multiple Punitive Damage Awards Do Not Violate the
Fundamental Fairness Component of the Due Process
Clause
Recently, in Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp.,14 Judge Sarokin
joined those jurists who take the position that multiple exemplary
awards for a single wrong violate the fundamental fairness require-
ment of due process. 46 But the Juzwin decision was unusual because
it was the first in the country to hold that subsequent plaintiffs would
not be able to recover punitive damages from a defendant if the de-
fendant had previously been subjected to punitive liability for the
same wrong.147 Realizing the inequity and impracticality of a solu-
tion which would cause plaintiffs to "race to the courthouse door," 148
Judge Sarokin later vacated the order in which he barred a subsequent
plaintiff's punitive damage claim, but reiterated his belief that multi-
ple punitive awards violated the Due Process Clause.' 49
Those jurists who argue that multiple punitive damage awards are
unconstitutional offer the vague statement that such awards violate
the "sense of fundamental fairness inherent in the Due Process
Clause." 5 But the fundamental fairness doctrine only requires that a
judicial proceeding comport with due process.15 1 As long as a defend-
145. 705 F. Supp. 1053, vacated, 718 F. Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989).
146. Juzwin, 705 F. Supp. at 1060-65.
147. "[T]he Juzwin decision cites no legal or equitable basis for allowing the first plain-
tiff who brings a claim to obtain punitive damages, and then, denying punitive damages,
as a matter of law, to all those who follow." Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 717 F.
Supp. 272, 283 (D.N.J. 1989). See also State ex reL Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61, 67,
618 P.2d 1268, 1272 (1980) ("Defendant has been unable to refer us to any jurisdiction,
nor have we found any independently, which has considered and adopted the one bite/
first comer approach to punitive damages.").
148. See, e.g., Leonen, 717 F. Supp. at 284.
149. See Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 718 F. Supp. 1233, 1236 (D.N.J. 1989).
150. "Unlimited multiple punishment for the same act determined in a succession of
individual lawsuits ... would violate the sense of 'fundamental fairness' that is essential
to constitutional due process." In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1188 (8th
Cir.) (Heaney, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). "The Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that adjudicatory proceedings be fundamentally
fair .... [T]his court concludes that [multiple awards of punitive damages for a single
course of conduct] can and do violate the 'fundamental fairness' requirement of the Due
Process Clause." Juzwin, 705 F. Supp. at 1060-61. "A defendant has a due process right
to be protected against unlimited multiple punishment for the same act.... [O]verlapping
damage awards violate that sense of 'fundamental fairness' which lies at the heart of
constitutional due process." In re Northern District of California "Dalkon Shield" IUD
Products Liability Litigation, 526 F. Supp. 887, 899 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated sub nom.
Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171
(1983).
151. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 449, 607 (5th ed. 1979) (fundamental fairness
doctrine means due process of law applied to judicial procedure).
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ant can litigate each case in which he faces punitive liability before a
fair and impartial court, there is no deprivation of due process.15 2
Fundamental fairness does not prevent a defendant from being sub-
jected to punitive liability in each action brought against him merely
because his outrageous conduct injured many people.153 Fundamen-
tal fairness may prevent a defendant in a case from paying more than
one punitive damage award to a single plaintiff.5 4 Such a double re-
covery of a penalty by a plaintiff from one defendant can reasonably
be said to undermine the fairness of a judicial proceeding that the Due
Process Clause requires."5 ' However, this is clearly different from the
situation in which many plaintiffs recover punitive damages for the
injuries each sustained by virtue of a defendant's single wrongful
act. 156
Courts correctly recognize that the overkill theory is an improper
basis for denying plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages. 57 If a de-
152. See id. See also Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1571 (6th
Cir. 1985) (stating that "we believe that the presence of a judicial tribunal before which to
litigate the propriety of a punitive damages award provides Johns-Manville with all of the
procedural safeguards to which it is due"), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986).
An interesting question is whether due process permits the application of offensive non-
mutual collateral estoppel to a finding of punitive liability in a mass tort litigation. See
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-31 (1979). In other words, if the plain-
tiff in case 1 recovers punitive damages against the Acme Corporation, does due process
allow Acme to be estopped from relitigating the finding of punitive liability in a subse-
quent case arising out of the same wrong? This topic is beyond the scope of this Note.
153. See Cathey, 776 F.2d at 1571. Indeed, punitive damages awarded to more than
one plaintiff would serve to "punish and deter the tortfeasor for the willful and wanton
invasion of the independent rights of each injured person." Wangen v. Ford Motor Co.,
97 Wis. 2d 260, 317, 294 N.W.2d 437, 466 (Wis. 1980).
154. See John Mohr & Sons, Inc. v. Jahnke, 55 Wis. 2d 402, 409, 198 N.W.2d 363, 367
(Wis. 1972) (stating that "to allow treble damages and punitive damages would amount
to double recovery of a penalty [by the claimant] and thus violate the basic fairness of a
judicial proceeding required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the federal constitution"). See also Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 317-19, 294 N.W.2d at 465-66.
155. See Jahnke, 55 Wis. 2d at 409-12, 198 N.W.2d at 367-68.
156. See Cathey, 776 F.2d at 1571; Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 317-19, 294 N.W.2d at 465-
66.
157. "'The relief sought by [the defendant] may be more properly granted by the state
. legislature than by this [c]ourt.' Accordingly, we ... reject the so-called 'overkill
doctrine' as a basis for denying an otherwise proper punitive damages recovery." Cathey,
776 F.2d at 1570 (quoting Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 817 (6th
Cir. 1982)). "Moreover there is no legal or equitable basis to allow punitive damage
awards to the first plaintiffs in multiple product liability litigation but then deny such a
right to recovery to future plaintiffs." Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, 548 F. Supp. 357,
376-77 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, 760 F.2d
481 (3d Cir. 1985). "[T]he Erie doctrine wisely prevents our engaging in such extensive
law-making on local tort liability, a subject which the people of New York have entrusted
to their legislature .... ." Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d
Cir. 1967).
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fendant's funds are limited, so that payment of exemplary damages to
early plaintiffs may preclude recovery of compensatory damages by
later claimants, the defendant may submit evidence of his potential
liability and straitened financial condition to the jury. 5 8  A court
should not, however, give legal and constitutional legitimacy to the
overkill argument by holding that multiple punitive damage awards
deprive a defendant of fundamental fairness.
3. The Standards for Determining Punitive Liability Are Not
Unconstitutionally Vague
If a state allows the imposition of exemplary damages upon proof
that a defendant's behavior was wanton, willful, malicious or outra-
geous, the first prong of the vagueness argument'5 9 must fail. The
description of conduct by such terms is not unconstitutionally vague.
In Jordan v. DeGeorge,160 the Supreme Court held that the test for
vagueness is "whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warn-
ing as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common under-
standing and practices."' 16' Using this test, the Court rejected an
assertion that the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" was void
for vagueness because such language had been construed without ex-
ception to embrace fraudulent conduct.' 62
158. Because mandatory class actions on the issue of punitive damages have not been
allowed in mass tort situations, see, e.g., In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1005
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915 (1986); Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847, 852
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983), allowing juries to consider evidence of
the prior and potential punitive liability of defendants is an appropriate alternative
method to deal with cumulative punitive damage awards. See Leonen v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272, 284 (D.N.J. 1989); State ex rel. Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61,
66-72, 618 P.2d 1268, 1271-74; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment e
(1978).
The Juzwin court's fears that evidence of prior and potential liability is prejudicial are
unwarranted. Consideration of such evidence can only enable jurors to realize that a
wrongdoer has been and will be subjected to exemplary damages in other actions. Conse-
quently, a jury will not be inclined to assess an exemplary award that, standing alone,
punishes and deters the defendant. In addition, separate trials on the issues of punitive
liability and the amount of punitive damages would prevent prejudice. If a jury could
review evidence of prior and potential awards only in the trial on the amount of damages,
then evidence of prior awards would not influence a jury's verdict on the issue of liability.
See, e.g., Corboy, License To Do Evil?, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 6, 1989, at 14, col. 1 (stating that
"[c]ourts already possess authority to protect defendants from prejudicial evidence, in-
cluding bifurcation of proceedings").
159. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
160. 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
161. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1951).
162. Id. at 232. DeGeorge involved a challenge to a statute which required the depor-
tation of any alien sentenced more than once to imprisonment for one year or more be-
cause of conviction in the United States for a crime involving moral turpitude.
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When measured by common understanding and practices, the
terms willful and wanton provide a sufficiently definite warning as to
proscribed conduct, and as a consequence are open to easy compre-
hension by any reasonable person or juror.163 As the Grace court
noted, wanton and willful conduct is defined as "[a] course of action
which shows actual or deliberate intention to harm or which, if not
intentional, shows an utter indifference or conscious disregard for the
rights of the others."' 164 The Grace court recognized that such behav-
ior had long served as a benchmark for the imposition of liability in
Illinois, 65 and correctly concluded that the phrases wanton and will-
ful provide juries with ample guidelines for determining when a de-
fendant's conduct qualifies for the imposition of punitive damages.' 66
California has adopted a vagueness test similar to the one fashioned
by the DeGeorge Court. In Fletcher v. Western National Life Insur-
ance Co. ,167 the California Court of Appeal held that a statute is suffi-
ciently certain if it employs words of long usage or with a common
law meaning.16  The court concluded that the terms "malice," "opt
163. See FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 691 F. Supp. 87, 99 (N.D. Inl. 1988), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 877 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1524 (1990). See
also Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272, 280 (D.N.J. 1989). In Lecnen,
the court stated:
Terms and phrases such as "wilfull"[sic], "wantonly reckless", "intentional"
and "deliberate act or omission with knowledge of a high degree of harm and
reckless indifference to consequences" are certainly open to easy comprehension
by the reasonable person or juror.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30
(1983), puts to rest any question regarding the vagueness of this standard. In
Smith v. Wade, a § 1983 defendant challenged the propriety of a punitive dam-
age award grounded on a "recklessness or callous indifference" standard as
based on too uncertain a standard to achieve deterrence rationally and fairly.
The Court clearly rejected defendant's vagueness argument, noting that it
adopted the "recklessness" standard over a century ago in Milwaukee & St.
Paul R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489 (1876), for the precise reason that it would
serve the need for adequate clarity in and fair application of punitive damage
standards. Furthermore, as plaintiff correctly points out, the Court employed
similar language in setting the standard for the imposition of punitive damages
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., an action which involved the issue of free speech,
a constitutionally protected activity. 418 U.S. at 349 (in defamation suits, puni-
tive damages may not be assessed unless there is a showing of knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth). Like the standards approved by the
Supreme Court in Smith v. Wade, supra, and Gertz, supra, the New Jersey stan-
dard implicates conduct which is intentional or recklessly indifferent.
Leonen; 717 F. Supp. at 280 (citations omitted).
164. Grace, 691 F. Supp. at 99.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
168. Id. at 405, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
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pression," and "fraud" all had well established meanings, 169 and re-
jected a defendant's claim that California's exemplary damage statute
was unconstitutionally vague. 170
Likewise, the term "outrageous" carries a sufficiently definite warn-
ing as to proscribed conduct when measured by common understand-
ings and practices. 17' Outrageous behavior has been construed to
mean acts done with malice or a reckless indifference to the rights of
another since 1939.172 The Alaska Supreme Court found that this
definition prevented jurors from arbitrarily deciding when to impose
punitive liability and provided fair warning of what conduct would
subject a person to punishment. 73 Accordingly, the court rejected a
vagueness challenge to Alaska's exemplary damage scheme.7 4
Therefore, when a state's punitive damage scheme is framed in lan-
guage that can be comprehended by reference to common under-
standings and practices, a defendant cannot argue that the standards
for imposing punitive liability are unconstitutionally vague.' 75 A de-
fendant can validly argue, however, that he has no notice that his
conduct will incur punitive liability when the plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion is a novel one. 176 Since a defendant has no prior knowledge that
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 46 (Alaska 1979), remanded on
rehearing, 615 P.2d 621 (1980), 627 P.2d 204, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981), overruled
on other grounds, Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 405 n.5 (1985).
172. "[I]n order to recover punitive ... damages, the plaintiff must prove that the
wrongdoer's conduct was 'outrageous, such as acts done with malice or bad motives or a
reckless indifference to the interests of another.' "Sturm, Ruger, 594 P.2d at 46 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973)). "The conduct
must be outrageous, either because the defendant's acts are done with an evil motive or
because they are done with reckless indifference to the rights of others." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment b (1979). "Punitive damages are awarded only for
outrageous conduct, that is, for acts done with a bad motive or with a reckless indiffer-
ence to the interests of others." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 908 comment b (1939).
173. See Sturm, Ruger, 594 P.2d at 46.
174. See id.
175. See DeGeorge, 341 U.S. at 231-32.
176. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Nees v.
Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). In Kelsay, the plaintiff employee alleged that
she was fired from her job because she filed a workmen's compensation claim. The appel-
late court reversed the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff, holding that Illinois did not
recognize a civil cause of action for retaliatory discharge. The Illinois Supreme Court
held that retaliatory discharge was actionable, but that "punitive damages should not be
awarded where, as here, the cause of action forming the basis for their award is a novel
one." Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 188, 384 N.E.2d at 359-60. In Nees, an employee sued her
employers, claiming that they fired her because she went on jury duty. The Oregon
Supreme Court held that the employers were liable for compensatory damages, but not
for punitive damages because they did not know at the time of the employee's discharge
that their conduct was improper. Nees, 272 Or. at 220-21, 384 P.2d at 517.
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his wanton and malicious conduct is subject to a lawsuit, he cannot be
aware that such conduct will subject him to punitive liability.'77 In
this situation, however, the defendant's lack of notice is not attributa-
ble to any flaw in the concept of exemplary damages and courts have
developed a way to solve this problem.' 78
For example, in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. ,1" a first impression case,
the Illinois Supreme Court held that an employee who had been fired
from her job for filing a workmen's compensation claim could bring a
civil suit against her employer. 8 ° Addressing the issue of punitive
liability, the Kelsay court recognized the conflict between the unfair-
ness of sustaining a punitive damage award against a defendant who
had no 'eason to believe his conduct was actionable, and the impor-
tance of protecting employees filing workmen's compensation claims
from retaliatory discharge. 8' The court struck a just balance and
held that punitive damages may be awarded in similar future retalia-
tory discharge actions, but not in the case at bar. 8 2
Clearly, juries have adequate guidelines for determining punitive
liability and defendants have ample protection from unanticipated as-
sessments of punitive damages. 83 Consequently, commentators are
beginning to realize that a vagueness attack focusing on the conduct
required for punitive liability is almost certain to fail. 84 Therefore,
these commentators are now directing their energies to invalidating
exemplary damages on the untested theory that the vagueness doc-
trine requires defendants to be aware of the potential size of a punitive
damage award. 85
4. The Due Process Clause Does Not Require Defendants To Be
Aware of the Potential Size of a Punitive Damage Award
Punitive damage schemes do not apprise defendants of the conse-
quences of wrongful behavior with the same precision as criminal sen-
tencing provisions. A tortfeasor in a civil action knows that if his
177. See Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 187-90, 384 N.E.2d at 360-61; Nees, 272 Or. at 220-21,
536 P.2d at 516-17.
178. See Kelsay, 74 111. 2d at 189, 384 N.E.2d at 361.
179. 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
180. Id. at 181-86, 384 N.E.2d at 357-59.
181. Id. at 186-90, 384 N.E.2d at 359-61.
182. Id. at 189, 384 N.E.2d at 361.
183. See supra notes 159-82 and accompanying text.
184. See Note, Banker's Life: Justice O'Connor's Solution to the Jury's Standardless
Discretion to Award Punitive Damages, supra note 33, at 736-37; Note, Can Punitive Dam-
ages Standards Be Void For Vagueness?, supra note 33, at 62.
185. See, e.g., Note, Can Punitive Damages Standards Be Void For Vagueness?, supra
note 33, at 62, 68.
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behavior meets certain standards, he will be subjected to punitive lia-
bility.'I 6 However, the wrongdoer is not aware of the size of an exem-
plary award that a jury may assess.18 7 Criminal defendants know the
consequences of their illegal acts with greater certainty because the
vagueness doctrine requires that penal statutes specify the penalties
available upon conviction.1 8 Thus, a criminal defendant is cognizant
of the maximum punishment that he can receive. 1 9 If punitive dam-
age schemes were reviewed under the stricter vagueness test reserved
for criminal statutes, due process would clearly require that defend-
ants be on notice of the potential size of an exemplary award. 9°
However, due process permits some uncertainty in sentencing pro-
visions.19' A criminal defendant charged with violating a particular
law need not be aware of the precise sentence he will receive if he is
eventually convicted. 92 He is only entitled to know the minimum
and maximum punishments that may be incurred. 93 In Village of
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 94 the Supreme
Court stated that due process demands less precision from enactments
which rely upon civil penalties for enforcement. 95 Therefore, a civil
statute which does not apprise defendants of the maximum punish-
186. See supra notes 159-85 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517, 1536 (D. Minn.
1989); FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 691 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 877 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1524 (1990); Toole v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 719, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 419 (1967).
188. According to the United States Supreme Court:
It is a fundamental tenet of due process that "[n]o one may be required at peril
of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes." A
criminal statute is therefore invalid if it "fails to give a person of ordinary intel-
ligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden." So too, vague
sentencing provisions may pose constitutional questions if they do not state
with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given criminal statute.
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979) (citations omitted).
189. See Note, The Imposition Of Punishment By Civil Courts: A Reappraisal Of Puni-
tive Damages, supra note 124, at 1169 ("Criminal statutes usually provide minimum and
maximum penalties for particular violations.").
190. See Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 123.
191. The Batchelder Court held:
Although the statutes create uncertainty as to which crime may be charged and
therefore what penalties may be imposed, they do so to no greater extent than
would a single statute authorizing various alternative punishments. So long as
overlapping criminal provisions clearly define the conduct prohibited and the
punishment authorized, tlie notice requirements of the Due Process Clause are
satisfied.
Id.
192. See id.; supra note 189.
193. See Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 123; supra note 189.
194. 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
195. Id. at 498-99.
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ment in terms of an explicit monetary limit cannot be considered un-
constitutionally vague. 196 Consequently, under the vagueness test
applicable to civil statutes, punitive damage schemes would not need
to forewarn defendants of the size of an exemplary award a jury may
assess. 1
97
The argument that exemplary damages should be subjected to the
stricter vagueness test rests on the assumption that punitive damage
schemes are equivalent to criminal sentencing provisions. 198 This as-
sumption is invalid. Penal statutes often provide for the incarceration
of offenders.199 By contrast, a defendant's liberty interests are not im-
plicated when he is subjected to punitive liability in a civil action be-
tween private parties.200 Even when the only consequence of violating
a penal statute is the imposition of a fine, the defendant suffers the
harsh stigma of a criminal conviction.20 1 A punitive damage judg-
ment does not carry with it the same degree of censure.20 2 Clearly,
196. For example, the Clayton Act punishes defendants found to have violated federal
antitrust laws not by imposing a fine of a statutorily prescribed sum, but rather by al-
lowing plaintiffs to recover treble damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). Treble damages
consist of compensatory damages found by the jury, actually tripled in amount. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1347 (5th ed. 1979). Compensatory damages in antitrust
cases are difficult to predict because they are based on the plaintiff's lost profits caused by
the defendant's violation. Thus, defendants have no idea of the actual size of the punish-
ment they may incur for violating the antitrust laws. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,
327 U.S. 251,' 263-64 (1946).
197. See Note, The Imposition Of Punishment By Civil Courts: A Reappraisal Of Puni-
tive Damages, supra note 124, at 1179-80.
198. See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
199. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00 (McKinney 1975).
200. "[T]he penalties in [Jordan v. DeGeorge and Giaccio v. Pennsylvania] are distin-
guishable from punitive damages because both cases involved a deprivation of liberty.
Punitive damages only result in a deprivation of property." Note, Banker's Life: Justice
O'Connor's Solution To The Jury's Standardless Discretion To Award Punitive Damages,
supra note 33, at 731. "In Jordan, the defendant was to be deported and forever barred
from achieving citizenship; in Giaccio, the defendant could be fined or imprisoned. Puni-
tive damages, of course, do not endanger the defendant's personal liberty; they affect only
his property." Note, The Imposition Of Punishment By Civil Courts: A Reappraisal Of
Punitive Damages, supra note 124, at 1178. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
201. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 137 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting)
(stating that "it would be unthinkable to convict a man for violating a law he could not
understand"); Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1058 (stating that
"little if any stigma would be attached to an award of punitive damages as compared to a
criminal conviction"), vacated, 718 F. Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989); Note, The Imposition Of
Punishment By Civil Courts: A Reappraisal Of Punitive Danages, supra note 124, at 1158
(stating that "[t]he stigma of a criminal record increases the effectiveness of criminal
punishment as a general deterrent").
202. Some commentators argue that punitive damage judgments carry a stigma as
damaging as criminal convictions. See Ingram, supra note 144, at 218; Note, Can Punitive
Damage Standards Be Void For Vagueness?, supra note 33, at 59-60 n.35. This assertion
cannot be true. A punitive damage judgment merely conveys the information that a
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the civil remedy of punitive damages is qualitatively less severe than
the penalties imposed by criminal law. Thus, .exemplary damage
schemes should be subjected to scrutiny under the lesser vagueness
standards applicable to civil statutes.2 °3
5. Punitive Damage Schemes Do Not Violate the Substantive
Component of the Due Process Clause
Punitive damage awards reflect the community's consensus on the
amount necessary in a given case to achieve the goals of punishment
and deterrence. 2°4 A jury need not award exemplary damages even
though a defendant's behavior is sufficiently culpable to incur punitive
liability.2 °5 Plaintiffs have no absolute right to recover punitive dam-
ages.2°' Therefore, an exemplary award can never be unreasonably
low. 207 Whether a punitive damage award can be so unreasonably
high as to be unconstitutional is a question of substantive due
process.20 8
The proposition that substantive due process limits the size of a
punitive damage award that a jury may assess is reasonable because
defendants should be protected from exemplary awards which are
wholly disproportionate to the offense at bar.209 But a penalty which
affects a significant portion of a defendant's wealth and which far ex-
ceeds actual damages suffered does not necessarily offend the Due
Process Clause.210 The proper inquiry for determining the existence
of a substantive due process violation should focus on whether the
penalty serves the purpose for which it is intended.211 A punitive
tortfeasor injured the plaintiff by acting with a certain mental state. It does not imply
that the wrongdoer violated the law. In addition, punitive damage defendants do not
have the equivalent of a criminal conviction record. See generally Wittman v. Gilson, 70
N.Y.2d 970, 972, 520 N.E.2d 514, 515, 525 N.Y.S.2d 795, 796 (1988) (stating that "a
civil verdict directing payment of punitive damages does not carry the same heavy socie-
tal stigma stamped by a criminal conviction no matter what sentence is imposed").
203. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
498-99 (1982).
204. See FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 691 F. Supp. 87, 100 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 877 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1524 (1990).
205. See, e.g., State ex rel Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61, 70, 618 P.2d 1268, 1273
(1980); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 301, 294 N.W.2d 437, 458 (Wis.
1980).
206. See Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 301, 294 N.W.2d at 458.
207. See id. at 302, 294 N.W.2d at 458.
208. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2921
(1989).
209. See St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919); Waters-
Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909).
210. See Waters-Pierce Oil Co., 212 U.S. at 111-12; Williams, 251 U.S. at 67.
211. See Williams, 251 U.S. at 67.
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damage award which is more than an amount reasonably necessary to
punish and deter does not serve the purpose for which it was in-
tended,21 2 and may thus be considered to be inconsistent with the sub-
stantive component of the Due Process Clause.213
Although exemplary awards may conceivably be inconsistent with
substantive due process, the same cannot be said of punitive damage
schemes.21 4 Instead of restricting the amount of damages that can be
awarded by an express statutory limit,215 punitive damage schemes
protect defendants from unconstitutionally excessive judgments by
means of exhaustive judicial scrutiny.216 Under the various state stan-
dards of review, trial and appellate judges routinely remit awards
which exceed the minimum amounts necessary to punish and deter.217
Punitive damage schemes prevent defendants in mass tort cases from
paying unconstitutional sums because reviewing courts consider a de-
fendant's prior and potential punitive liability when determining
whether the punitive damage award at bar should stand.21 8 An exem-
plary award which exceeds an amount reasonably necessary to punish
and deter in light of prior and potential punitive damage awards for
212. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 303, 294 N.W.2d 437, 459 (Wis.
1980) (stating that "[a]n award which is more than necessary to serve its purposes (pun-
ishment and deterrence) or which inflicts a penalty or burden on the defendant which is
disproportionate to the wrongdoing is excessive and is contrary to public policy"). The
minimum amount reasonably necessary to punish and deter must depend upon the pecu-
liar facts and circumstances of each case. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, 548 F.
Supp. 357, 377 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines,
760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985).
213. See Williams, 251 U.S. at 66-67.
214. The Williams Court intimated that if a penalty is excessive, the statute which
prescribed it would be contrary to due process. See id. at 66. Although a jury might
assess an unconstitutional punitive damage award, that award will invariably be reduced
or vacated by a reviewing court. Thus, by the time the judgment is entered, the punitive
award will have been reduced to a constitutionally permissible amount. See infra notes
216-20 and accompanying text.
215. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2921
(1989); Williams, 251 U.S. at 64.
216. See supra notes 136-44 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 48-49 (Alaska 1979), re-
manded on rehearing, 615 P.2d 621 (1980), 627 P.2d 204, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894
(1981), overruled on other grounds, Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 405 n.5 (1985);
Estate of Hartz v. Nelson, 437 N.W.2d 749, 755-57 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
218. See Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. 776 F.2d 1565, 1572 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986); FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 691 F. Supp. 87, 100
(N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 877 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 1524 (1990); Sturm, Ruger, 594 P.2d at 48; Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal.
App. 3d 757, 819, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 388 n.14 (1981); Hazlewood v. Illinois Cent.
G.R.R., 114 Ill. App. 3d 703, 713-14, 450 N.E.2d 1199, 1207 (1983); Fischer v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 103 N.J. 643, 670, 512 A.2d 466, 480 (1986).
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the same conduct will be reversed or remitted.219 Consequently, de-
fendants seldom, if ever, pay exemplary awards which do not comport
with substantive due process. Thus, because judicial review of exem-
plary damages precludes the possibility of constitutionally impermis-
sible awards, punitive damage schemes cannot be considered to be
violative of substantive due process.22
B. Policy Reasons
Defendants and insurers who challenge the validity of punitive
damage schemes under the Due Process Clause clearly desire predict-
ability.22' However, there is a compelling reason for retaining a sys-
tem in which the degree of a civil defendant's punishment is not
known with absolute certainty.222 In addition to punishing the de-
fendant, exemplary damages serve the function of deterrence. 223 De-
fendants are deterred from future wrongs, and by way of example,
others are also deterred from similar misconduct.224 Federal and state
courts recognize that where a defendant is a large company or corpo-
ration, exemplary damages deter the defendant from deciding that it
is cheaper to be sued and pay compensatory damages than to remedy
a dangerous condition.225
219. The Supreme Court of New Jersey stated:
When evidence of other punitive awards is introduced, trial courts should in-
struct juries to consider whether the defendant has been sufficiently punished,
keeping in mind that punitive damages are meant to punish and deter defend-
ants for the benefit of society .... Should a trial court determine that an award
is "manifestly outrageous" or "grossly excessive," it may reduce that award or
order a new trial on punitive damages. In evaluating the excessiveness of chal-
lenged punitive damage awards, trial courts are expressly authorized to con-
sider prior punitive damage awards.
Fischer, 103 N.J. at 670, 512 A.2d at 480 (citation omitted).
220. See St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66 (1919).
221. See Corboy, supra note 158, at 14, cols. 2-3.
222. See id.
223. See Kelco Disposal v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., 845 F.2d 404, 409 (2d Cir.
1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989); Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d
1565, 1580 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986); Brown v. Missouri Pac.
R.R., 703 F.2d 1050, 1053 (8th Cir. 1983); FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 691 F. Supp. 87,
98 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 877 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1524 (1990); Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, 548 F. Supp. 357, 376 (E.D. Pa.
1982), aff'd sub nor. Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.
1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
224. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
225. Brown, 703 F.2d at 1053 ("The Arkansas Supreme Court will allow punitive dam-
ages to deter a defendant from deciding that it is cheaper to be sued and pay compensa-
tory damages than to remedy a dangerous condition."); Neal, 548 F. Supp. at 376
("Punitive damages serve to deter manufacturers from accepting the risk of paying com-
pensatory damages rather than changing the business practice which would result in ex-
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Punitive damages have this deterrent effect on corporate defendants
precisely because the size of an exemplary award cannot be antici-
pated with certainty.226 Were it otherwise, the corporate defendant
would be able to include punitive damages as a known factor in the
equation to determine the cost of doing business.227 In such a situa-
tion, the likelihood that hazardous practices would go unchecked
would greatly increase.228
In sum, punitive damages are awarded to plaintiffs only when a
defendant's conduct is wanton, willful, malicious or outrageous.229
There is no reason for large corporations to abandon new projects for
fear of punitive liability.23° Such defendants cannot be punished in
civil lawsuits for simple negligence. 31
IV. Conclusion
Challenges to punitive damages brought on procedural due process,
fundamental fairness and traditional vagueness grounds are likely to
fail. A defendant's procedural due process rights are preserved be-
cause juries are not given standardless discretion to determine a de-
fendant's punishment. In addition, defendants have the added
protection of thorough judicial review. Where a defendant's wrongful
conduct injures many people, fundamental fairness does not limit the
recovery of punitive damages to one plaintiff. The traditional void for
vagueness argument fails because common law standards of culpabil-
ity are sufficiently defined to clearly inform juries and defendants of
what conduct qualifies for the imposition of punitive liability.
Exemplary damage schemes should be held to the more permissive
vagueness standards reserved for civil statutes. Under these stan-
tra costs."); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 47 (Alaska 1979) ("[T]he threat of
punitive damages serves a deterrence function in cases in which.., it would be cheaper
for the manufacturer to pay compensatory damages... then [sic] it would be to remedy
the product's defect."), remanded on rehearing, 615 P.2d 621 (1980), 627 P.2d 204, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Dura Corp. v. Harred, 703 P.2d
396, 405 n.5 (1985).
226. See Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 218 (Colo. 1984).
227. Id. (stating that "[i]f punitive damages are predictably certain, they become just
another item in the cost of doing business").
228. See Corboy, supra note 158, at 14, col. 3.
229. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
230. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2924 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The threat of such enormous
[punitive damage] awards has a detrimental effect on the research and development of
new products.").
231. "[Plunitive damages are not recoverable if the wrongdoer's conduct is merely neg-
ligent." Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 275, 294 N.W.2d 437, 446 (Wis.
1980).
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dards, due process does not require punitive damage defendants to be
aware of the potential size of a jury award. Finally, because extensive
judicial review ensures that defendants never pay constitutionally im-
permissible sums, courts should conclude that punitive damage
schemes do not offend substantive due process.
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